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AGORA: REFLECTIONS ON RJR NABISCO V. EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
THE FRANKENSTEIN’S MONSTER OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY LAW 
Anthony J. Colangelo* 
The judge-made presumption against extraterritoriality has recently become a motley patchwork of  eccentric 
and sometimes contradictory doctrines seemingly stitched together for one, and only one, mission: to deprive 
plaintiffs the right to sue in U.S. courts for harms suffered abroad. It lumbers along, blithely squashing prece-
dent, principle, statutory text, and legislative intent—all to heed its abiding and single-minded obsession. The 
Supreme Court has so far mangled the scope of  the Securities Exchange Act1 and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),2 
and, in RJR Nabisco v. European Community, has placed another statute—The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO)—on the chopping block.3 The major surgery performed was amputating RICO’s 
private right of  action for extraterritorial offenses and replacing it with a much stubbier appendage limited to 
injuries suffered on U.S. territory.  
This contribution makes several observations. The first focuses on the Court’s loose but potentially loaded 
language that the presumption applies to jurisdictional statutes.4 This is of  course an outgrowth of  the Court’s 
2013 decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, which applied the presumption to the cause of  action authorized 
by the ATS—a statute that Kiobel itself  acknowledged is “strictly jurisdictional.” I am less sure than others that 
Kiobel avoided applying the presumption to the ATS proper (as opposed to merely the cause of  action the ATS 
authorized), especially in light of  the post-Kiobel lower-court trend, which treats challenges to the ATS’s geo-
graphic scope as going to subject-matter jurisdiction, not the merits. My concern is that RJR may now swing 
wide open the door for courts to deploy the presumption to dismiss suits on subject-matter jurisdiction grounds 
more generally.  
My second observation is that, despite its lip service to the contrary, RJR’s application of  the presumption 
frustrates Congress and damages international relations. Herein lies a deep irony, for deference to Congress 
and reduction of  international friction are precisely the considerations that originated the presumption and 
supposedly motivate it today. Yet rather than stay faithful to its origins as essentially a separation-of-powers 
canon designed to effectuate legislative supremacy and judicial modesty, it has paradoxically become a thor-
oughly judge-directed creature that carelessly neglects the real stakes in particular cases for needlessly formalistic 
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1 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
2 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
3 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
4 Id. at 2099-2100, slip op. at 7-8.
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elaborations that, in practice, defeat its intended purpose and allow the Court complete discretion to ignore 
congressional directives. 
The Presumption and Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
Kiobel did something new with the presumption by applying it to the cause of  action authorized by a juris-
dictional statute. Up until that point, as the Court noted, the presumption had “typically appl[ied] . . . to discern 
whether an Act of  Congress regulating conduct applies abroad.”5 That is, the presumption applied to statutes 
that contained what are usually referred to as “conduct-regulating” rules. Prior precedents had therefore placed 
the presumption’s work squarely in the realm of  U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction, as opposed to U.S. adjudicative 
jurisdiction regarding whether and when courts may entertain suit—a category to which subject-matter juris-
diction statutes and rules pertain. Indeed, Kiobel acknowledged that the Court had, just three years earlier in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, explicitly recognized that the presumption bears upon the merits rather than 
subject-matter jurisdiction.6 
The problem was that the statute Kiobel addressed, the ATS, was—according to the Court itself—“strictly 
jurisdictional.”7 The Court’s solution was to apply the presumption to the cause of  action the ATS authorized. 
This alone was odd, or at least novel. The presumption had always been a canon of  statutory construction—but 
here, the Court was purporting to apply it not to the statute itself  (since that would have directly contradicted 
Morrison), but to the cause of  action the statute authorized. I don’t find this necessarily illogical, but I also don’t 
find it convincing. While purporting not to be construing the ATS itself  in light of  the presumption, the Court 
nevertheless wound up construing the ATS through the lens of  the presumption to determine whether and 
how it applied to the cause of  action the ATS authorized.8 
These concerns have been vindicated post-Kiobel. The overwhelming lower-court trend treats challenges to 
the ATS’s ambit as challenges to the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.9 A multitude of  courts have even raised 
the issue sua sponte precisely because they view the presumption as pertaining to subject-matter jurisdiction 
rather than the merits.10 If  the presumption’s work were really limited only to the cause of  action—that is to 
say, “[a] group of  operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing”11—these dispositions should have 
been merits-based. That is, because the facts in question occurred outside the reach of  the law, there was no 
legally cognizable cause of  action. This whole line of  cases thus appears inconsistent with Morrison. Perhaps it 
will be reversed someday. But it certainly doesn’t endorse a charitable reading of  Kiobel’s attempt to avoid ap-
plying the presumption to a subject-matter jurisdiction statute. 
5 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664. 
6 Id. (citing and quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253-254). 
7 Id. 
8 As I’ve explained elsewhere,  
although the Court strained to cabin the presumption’s work “to claims under the ATS,” it invariably had to ask about the statute 
itself, concluding that “nothing in the [ATS] rebuts that presumption.” And once that inevitable statutory inquiry is made, it 
becomes pellucid that no principled distinction exists between gauging the presumption’s applicability to the ATS on the one hand, 
and its applicability to [the subject matter jurisdiction statute in Morrison] on the other, and that Kiobel renders the law incoherent. 
Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303, 1339 (2014). 
9 See, e.g., Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653 (4th Cir. Feb. 1, 2016); Doe v. Drummond, 782 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Anthony J. 
Colangelo & Christopher R. Knight, Post-Kiobel Procedure: Subject Matter Jurisdiction or Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 19 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. 
AFF. 49, 56 & n.35 (2015). 
10 Colangelo and Knight, supra note 9 at 56 & n.33.  
11 Cause of  Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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And now in RJR the Court has explicitly stated that it “must” evaluate statutes according to the presumption 
“regardless of  whether the statute in question regulates conduct, affords relief, or merely confers jurisdiction 
[read: subject matter jurisdiction].”12 William Dodge insightfully and correctly notes that this makes no sense 
in light of  the rest of  the opinion.13 But given Kiobel’s application in the lower courts, I am worried that this 
loose language will be read to extend the presumption to subject-matter jurisdiction statutes more generally.  
The Private Right of  Action    
RJR’s most significant holding is that RICO creates a private right of  action only for injuries suffered on U.S. 
territory. This isn’t unexpected news—courts have been diluting RICO’s private enforcement provisions for 
some time now, for example, by imposing the old judge-made revenue rule to override what seemed like fairly 
straightforward statutory directives.14 It was also presaged by Morrison’s and Kiobel’s powerful invigoration of  
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
I want to suggest, however, that the presumption’s application to RICO’s private right of  action contradicts 
the canon’s own origins as a separation-of-powers and foreign relations doctrine. Far from safeguarding legis-
lative supremacy, RJR reflects the Court’s use of  the presumption to transform the statute that Congress 
enacted into one the Court would have preferred.  
The presumption against extraterritoriality is based on two rationales. One is the assumption that Congress 
legislates with only domestic concerns in mind; the other is avoiding international friction that could result 
from unintended U.S. jurisdictional overreach. As to this second rationale, the operative qualification is unin-
tended, which translates to “unintended by the political branches.” The foreign relations worry is that, absent the 
presumption, courts might extend U.S. law abroad in ways the political branches never intended, sparking unin-
tended international discord. But if  the political branches intended U.S. law to apply abroad, a judicial refusal 
to effectuate that directive would be tantamount to courts overriding the political branches. The Supreme Court 
invented the presumption in 1818 in United States v. Palmer,15 with both of  these rationales playing a part to limit 
the reach of  a U.S. statute outlawing piracy. And the Court has repeated these rationales in its most recent 
presumption against extraterritoriality opinions, including RJR.16 
Congress legislates with only domestic concerns in mind 
Let’s begin with rationale one: the assumption that Congress legislates with domestic concerns in mind. RJR 
presents a couple of  interesting twists here. The first goes to the statutory structure of  RICO, which proscribes 
certain patterns of  racketeering activity. Notably, RICO itself  says nothing about extraterritoriality. Rather, it 
defines racketeering activity by reference to various federal and state offenses, or what are called “predicates.” 
The Court nevertheless concluded (correctly) that, because some of  the predicate offenses clearly have extra-
territorial reach, so too do RICO’s racketeering provisions. Hence, its “unique structure makes RICO the rare 
statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of  extraterritoriality.”17 
12 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2101, slip op. at 9. 
13 William S. Dodge, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Still Does Not Apply to Jurisdictional Statutes, OPINIO JURIS (July 1, 2016, 
4:57 PM). 
14 Attorney Gen. of  Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2001); cf. id. at 137 (Calabresi, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 537 
U.S. 1000 (2002). 
15 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). 
16 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2100, slip op. at 8. 
17 Id. at 2103, slip op. at 10. 
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The Court thus “looked through” the RICO statute to the underlying predicate statutes to discern RICO’s 
geographic coverage as to certain racketeering activities, specifically money laundering and material support to 
foreign terrorist organizations. Thus, unlike in Morrison and Kiobel, the Court found that Congress did not have 
only domestic concerns in mind. Instead, because Congress had affirmatively indicated that the predicate of-
fenses applied to these foreign activities, so too did RICO’s substantive provisions and, accordingly, the 
government could enforce both criminal and civil penalties. 
But as to the private right of  action, the Court was not willing to look through RICO to the predicates in 
order to discern the statute’s geographic scope. As the Dissent observed, this seems incongruous.18 The reason 
the Court gave is unpersuasive and unsettling, at least if  the point of  the presumption is to protect legislative 
supremacy against judicial interference. To defend limiting RICO’s statutory private right of  action, the Court 
drew from Kiobel’s holding and reasoning that the presumption applied to a judicially-crafted private right of  
action under the ATS and extended that holding and reasoning to a legislatively-crafted private right of  action. 
Indeed, the Court defended the presumption’s application to RICO’s private right of  action by quoting Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain’s statement that “‘[t]he creation of  a private right of  action raises issues beyond the mere con-
sideration whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision to 
permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion.’”19  
The Court’s reliance on this aspect of  Sosa is unpersuasive. In RJR the Court was emphatically not asked to 
“creat[e] a private right of  action.” The political branches had already done that when they enacted RICO’s 
explicit private right of  action in the statute. Moreover, placed in its broader context, the import of  the Sosa 
quotation becomes even clearer, and RJR’s reliance on it more troubling. Immediately preceding the quoted 
text, Sosa explained, “this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of  
action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of  cases.”20 And in support, Sosa cited—
unsurprisingly—other Supreme Court cases that dealt with judicially inferred or created private rights of  action 
in the absence of  a legislatively enacted right.21 But again, in RICO there is a legislatively enacted right. To the 
extent the political branches were worried about a lack of  prosecutorial discretion, presumably that worry had 
already been (democratically) taken into account and overcome, because Congress in fact enacted the right. Far 
from crafting rights that the legislature didn’t, the Court refused to enforce legislatively created rights through 
an incongruous and selective application of  the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Furthermore, the Court trimmed away not just any private right of  action. RICO’s structure and provision 
for treble damages places this right in the category of  private enforcement of  public law, or what has been 
referred to as deputizing “private attorneys general responsible for enforcing the nation’s . . . laws.”22 Accord-
ingly, while there is good reason to believe that Congress was concerned with broad access to relief  under 
RICO,23 including by foreign governments,24 there is also good reason to believe that Congress intended the 
private enforcement right to be largely coextensive with the government’s public enforcement right.25 The stat-
ute’s solicitude comprises not only injury but also wrongdoing. Limiting RICO’s private right of  action to 
18 Id. at 2116, slip op. at 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
19 Id. at 2106, slip op. at 15 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)). 
20 Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 727. 
21 Id.  
22 Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D 33, 49 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
23 Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. Inc, 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985). 
24 RJR, 136 S.Ct. at 2116, slip op. at 8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
25 See e.g., Sedima, 473 U.S. at 483, 488. 
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domestic injuries is not only incongruous in terms of  statutory text and unpersuasive in terms of  precedent, 
but also contrary to the statutory scheme Congress in fact enacted.26  
Preventing International Friction  
The second rationale behind the presumption is avoiding unintended international discord. The curious 
wrinkle in RJR when it comes to the foreign relations rationale is that judicial application of  the presumption 
was far more likely to cause foreign relations friction than to avoid it. The plaintiff  was comprised of  precisely 
those nations into whose territories U.S. law would have extended.27 But instead of  potentially resenting the 
application of  U.S. law, they explicitly and repeatedly requested it. Thus we have affirmative evidence that the 
relevant foreign nations wanted RICO’s private right of  action to extend into their territories.28 Indeed, the 
Court’s refusal to provide foreign governments the same access to justice as the U.S. government—and with 
no textual basis whatsoever for that distinction—smacks of  unequal treatment and itself  risks foreign resent-
ment and international friction. 
The Court’s response to this concern was highly formalistic. According to the Court, “even assuming that” 
the foreign nations in RJR wanted U.S. law to apply and saw no interference with their sovereignty, “our inter-
pretation of  §1964(c)’s [private right of  action] injury requirement will necessarily govern suits by 
non­governmental plaintiffs that are not so sensitive to foreign sovereigns’ dignity.”29 But RJR clearly illustrates 
that the presumption empowers judicial line drawing; in this case, a line between public and private enforce-
ment. The Court failed to explain why it was willing to draw that line and not others. Here it is important to 
recall that the presumption is merely a judicial invention, devised in part to help courts avoid international 
discord. If  the Court is willing to take into consideration the identity of  the suitor in evaluating the presump-
tion’s interaction with foreign relations when that suitor is the U.S. government, why not also when the suitors 
are the very foreign nations whose sovereignty would supposedly be infringed? When the reality is that applying 
the presumption would enhance, not diminish, foreign relations frictions, the courts should deem the presump-
tion inapplicable.  
Nothing requires layering onto the presumption a formalistic gloss that prevents courts from considering 
the real-world implications of  their decisions so as to avoid paradoxically frustrating the presumption’s very 
own objectives. Just as the presumption is a judicial creation, so too is the formalistic (as opposed to, say, 
functional) gloss the Court has recently painted it with. By removing the presumption from the actual context 
and circumstances of  cases like RJR, the canon has taken on a life of  its own, and now seems simply to run 
roughshod over anything that stands in the way of  its myopic quest to quash the private right of  action in 
transnational cases. 
* * * * 
 
26 On top of all this is that RICO’s private right of action was modeled after the Clayton Act’s private right of action, and courts had 
interpreted that to extend to causes of action arising abroad.  
27 See RJR Nabisco v. European Community, No. 15-138, Brief  for Petitioners, ii (Dec. 2015) (listing parties to the proceeding). 
28 This seems to fit perfectly within Hannah Buxbaum’s consent-based approach to the use of  domestic litigation to address trans-
national regulatory problems, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006). 
29 RJR, 136 S. Ct. at 2108, slip op. at 16. 
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Herein lies a supreme irony in RJR’s application of  the presumption against extraterritoriality. As the Court 
observed, RICO’s “unique structure” makes it “the rare statute that clearly evidences extraterritorial effect de-
spite lacking an express statement of  extraterritoriality.”30 The Court reached this conclusion by invoking 
Morrison’s statement that “‘[a]ssuredly context can be consulted as well’” in discerning extraterritoriality, and, 
“[c]ontext is dispositive here.”31 Yet the Court ignored major contextual cues that RICO’s private right of  action 
does extend extraterritorially, namely: (1) RICO’s text, which creates an explicit private right, enacted by Con-
gress to enhance enforcement of  the statute’s underlying substantive norms; (2) RICO’s structure, which 
includes no mention of  extraterritoriality as to either public or private enforcement, suggesting that the en-
forcement mechanisms ought to be viewed coextensively as to the underlying substantive norms; and (3) the 
parties to the suit, with the relevant foreign nations seeking the application of  U.S. law. Recognizing the extra-
territorial scope of  RICO’s private right of  action would not only have comported with the statute’s text and 
structure, but also would have effectuated one of  the presumption’s key purposes. 
 
30 Id. at 2103, slip op. at 10. 
31 Id. (quoting in part Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265). 
